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Students' Rights in Indiana: Wrongful
Distribution of Student Records and
Potential Remedies
SANDRA L. MACKLIN"

INTRODUCTION

The state-supported university at which Jane was a graduate student considered
her a non-resident of the state for tuition purposes, but she hoped to prove to the
Committee on Residence that her status should be changed. After all, she had been
in the state for several years and had numerous ties to it. She knew from the
information packet on residency which she received from the Registrar that the
members of the Committee would be composed of professors, trustees, and even a
few students. The head of the Committee introduced himself to Jane, and, after a
few brief introductory remarks, said that "everyone has a copy of your record."
Jane, who sat next to two student Committee members, saw that each had a copy of
her grades. Stunned and not knowing what to say, Jane stuttered, "O.K."
Later, Jane remembered that at her state-supported undergraduate institution
grades were never posted and were never released to anyone but the student or her
parents because of a certain law. Jane called the head Committee member the next
day and asked about the need for her grades. The Committee member told her that
her record was needed to show that Jane was registered and progressing well in her
studies at the University. He added that the students had Jane's grades for "only a
week." When Jane inquired about the access the students' roommates or friends had
to her records, the Committee member said that the students on the Committee were
bound by an oath not to discuss other students' records.
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA" or the "Buckley
Amendment")1 is the little discussed law to which Jane referred. Unfortunately for
Jane, FERPA is effectively impotent because of its lack of enforcement
mechanisms; however, the weakness of FERPA has been buttressed by increased
protection provided by most states and by improved remedies offered by many state
courts.2 If in the above hypothetical Jane were attending a school in the State of
Indiana, then her situation would be more ominous, for no such bolstering
mechanisms are provided by that state. As a result, those Indiana parents and
students whose FERPA rights have been violated by Indiana schools have no real
recourse, and the schools have an open invitation to abuse their power over student
records. This should not be the case.

* S.D. Candidate, 1999, Indiana University School ofLaw-Bloomington; MA, English,
1996, Purdue University, MA., History, 1995, Purdue University, BA, 1992, Saint Mary's
College. The authorwould like to thankProfessor Fred K.Cate for his helpful comments on earlier

drafts of this Note.
1. 20 U.S.CA § 1232g (West 1990 & Supp. 1999).
2. See infra Part IlI.B-C.
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Courts in several states and two Circuits have held § 19831 claims applicable
under FERPA.4 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that § 1983
permits claims that are based not on alleged constitutional violations, but on alleged
violations of federal statutes.' Violations of FERPA are violations of students'
rights to privacy, and those students should be able to redress their grievances.
Therefore, a method of relief such as that provided by § 1983 should be applied by
Indiana courts as well.
This Note first reviews the background of both the idea of privacy and the
Buckley Amendment, analyzing especially the operation of that statute. Next, this
Note discusses the status of student privacy rights in Indiana and other states,
contrasting the lack of remedies available to an Indiana student whose rights have
been violated by an Indiana school with those available to students in other states.
Finally, this Note concludes with recommendations for the State of Indiana for
increasing student privacy protection.
I. TIm RIGHT oF PRIVACY
Different people interpret the term "privacy" differently. For some, it simply
refers to "the right to be left alone," while for others it may have a more complex
association, such as "the right" to an abortion." Still for others, it may mean the
right to be secure in the solitude of one's own home, free from governmental
intrusions. This Note, however, is interested only in the university student's rights
to information privacy, meaning "the legal rights of individuals in relation to
information about them that is circulating throughout society,"7 specifically within
the school system.
Most people have boundaries around and about themselves which they would like
to remain free from outside invasion. These areas differ among individuals, but it
is widely recognized that "traditional family relationships such as husband-wife and
professional ones such as doctor-patient or lawyer-client deserve maximum levels
of confidentiality."' However, relationships between students and school systems
also deserve some measure of privacy. Indeed, early ideas about a right to privacy
arose from a "desire to safeguard individual autonomy and to protect traditional
relationships against government intrusion"; 9 the right to privacy, in turn, evolved
to protect the relationship between students and the data about them kept by their
schools.
A distinct body of law about the notion of privacy emerged following the
publication of an article written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. In their
article, The Right to Privacy, published in 1890 in the HarvardLaw Review,

3.42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1 1996).
4. See infra Part IJ3; infra note 182.
5. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
6. EVANHENDRICKs ET AL., YOUR RIGHT TO PRIVACYA BAsic GUIDE TO LEGAL RGHTS IN
AN INFORMATION SocIETY XI (2d ed. 1990). The introduction of this book influenced the
organization of this Part.

7. Id.
8.Id. at xii.

9. Id.
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Warren and Brandeis advocated that an individual maintained an interest in
preventing the publication of private matters by the press."0 After delineating
proposed limits on privacy rights," Warren and Brandeis suggested that an action
for tort be available to victims in all cases involving an invasion of privacy and an
injunction be available in a limited number of cases.' 2 Following the famed authors'
advice, courts and legislatures slowly accepted, defined, and enforced numerous
principles which were generally described as a "right to privacy."3
A. Early Court Decisions
As noted above, courts originally recognized violations of privacy as a tort. That
is, courts typically saw the right to privacy as protecting only against tangille
intrusions which resulted in a measurable injury. Because courts thought of privacy
in terms of torts, they. took longer to recognize and discuss the more difficult
constitutional issues of personal autonomy and information control. 4
The United States Supreme Court first explored constitutional principles relating
to privacy during the first part of this century." In 1923, the Court found
unconstitutional a Nebraska law which required all school subjects to be taught in
English, and prohibited the teaching of any language other than English to a student
who had not passed the eighth grade.' 6 Using the "letter and spirit of the
Constitution"' 7 as a guide, the Court declared that "individual[s] ha[ve] certain
fundamental rights which must be respected.""' Two years later, the Court again
recognized the "fundamental theory of liberty" 9 when it struck down an Oregon law
requiring, with few exceptions, all children to attend public schools until
completion of the eighth grade.20
Other such decisions followed slowly. The Court combined its recognition of
personal autonomy with the value of information control and First Amendment
associational privacy when, in 1958, it refused to allow a state to compel the

10. Samuel D. Warren &Louis D. Brandeis, TheRight to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REv. 193,19597(1890).
11. See i at 214-19. Warren and Brandeis proposed six limitations. They suggested that the
rightto privacy should not protect the publication of general knowledge or information disclosed
ata public hearing, nor should it disallow oral publication (as during a speech). See id. at 214-17.
Also, they thought that the right ceased when a person consented to publication or published the
information himself or herself See id at 218. Truth and the absence of malice were not considered
defenses to an invasion of privacy. See id.
12.Id. at 219.
13. See W. PAGE KEEToN BT AL., PRossER AND KEEToN ON TH LAW OF ToRTs 850-51 (5th
ed. 1984). New Yorkwas the first state to accept the principle, followed by Massachusetts. See id.
at 850 & n.10.
14. See HEmRicKs T ALT.,supra note 6, at xiiL
15. See id.
16. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,403 (1923).
17.Id. at 402.
18.Id. at 401.
19. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
20. See id. at 531-32, 536.

1324

INDIANA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 74:1321

disclosure of organizational membership lists.2 The Court held that "immunity from
state scrutiny of membership lists... is... so related to the right of the members
to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others
in so doing as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment," 22
confirming the notion that any state action that effectively thwarts the freedom to
associate should be subjected to close scrutiny.23 In Mapp v. Ohio, the Court
declared that the Fourth Amendment grants a right to privacy that is as important
as any other constitutional right.24 Furthering this idea, the Court in 1965 decided
in Griswoldv. Connecticut' that the Constitution protects a right of sexual privacy,
noting that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights creates "zones of privacy"
within a "penumbra."26 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, said that the First
Amendment grants people the right of associational privacy and a certain degree of
protection from governmental intrusion.27 Justice Douglas also noted that the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments affirm the people's
"right" to be free from governmental
28
invasions of themselves and their homes.
Subsequent cases have followed and expanded upon the reasoning of the
Griswold Court. In 1967, in Katz v. United States, 29 the Court ruled that
wiretapping without a warrant was unconstitutional and, in the process, created the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard." The Katz Court emphasized that "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"'" suggesting that constitutional
protection is provided by the Bill of Rights for more than just tangible property, but
for a person's "communications, personality, politics, and thoughts."32 Indeed, the
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments were invoked to create the "right to choose" an
33
abortion in the still controversial 1973 decision of Roe v. Wade.

21. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 466 (1958) ("It is beyond debate that
fieedom to engage inassociation for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect
ofhe 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
freedom of speech.).
22.Id. at 466.
'23. See id.at 460-61.
24.367 U.S. 643,656-57 (1961).
25.381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. Id.at 483-84.
27. See id.
28. See id.at 484 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,630 (1886)).
29.389 U.S. 347 (1967).
30. See id. at 353 ("The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording
the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment").
31.Id. at 351.
32. See HENDRICKS ETAL., supranote 6, at xv.
33.410 U.S. 113,153 (1973) ("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action... or... in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.').
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However, a year later, in 1974, the Court evinced a marked shift in its position.
In CaliforniaBanker'sAs 'n v. Shultz," the Court held that a law targeting money
launderers which required banks to keep copies of customer records and allowed
government authorities unlimited access to them did not deprive the banks of due
process by imposing heavy burdens on them, and, by implication, did not violate
their customers' privacy rights.35 The 1976 decision in United States v. Miller 6
solidified the restrictive trend. The Court refused to find that the Constitution
provided a right to privacy in bank records; rather, when opening an account,
people assumed the risk that the bank would convey their bank records to the
government." Miller's importance became apparent when the Court applied its
reasoning to other cases involving personal records held by third parties.3 8 For
example, in 1977, the Court upheld a New York law requiring that the name and
address of anyone obtaining narcotics by a doctor's prescription be forwarded to the
state for storage in a centralized computer system.39 In 1979, a target in a criminal
probe objected to the police's receipt of his telephone records;" however, the Court
maintained that the phone company could provide such information to the police
without notice to or consent from the customer."
B. EarlyLegislative Action
The Court, after 1974, had announced that Congress, not the courts, would have
to create legal protection for personal information stored in institutional computers.
Perhaps sensing the Court's position, Congress passed the Privacy Act in 1974.2
The Privacy Act applies to federal agencies and grants individuals access to and the
ability to correct their records.43 The Act also allows disclosures to other federal or
44
non-federal entities only with the concerned person's written consent.
Congressional privac advocates desired a law that covered both governmental
files and privately held records; however, President Gerald Ford maintained that he
would veto such a bill."5 Congress compromised by limiting the scope of the
Privacy Act to federal files and creating the Privacy Protection Study Commission
to study the recordkeeping practices of employers, banks, and other private

34.416 U.S. 21 (1974).
35. See id. at 46, 50. To support its decision, the Court cited the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code which require a third party to report to the government any income paid to an
individual. See id. at 47.
36.425 U.S. 435 (1976).
37. See id. at 442-43.
38. See HENDRICKs FTAL., supra note 6, at xvi-xvii.
39. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977).
40. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,737 (1979).
41. See id. at 742-44.
42. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896,1897 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994
& Supp. 11997)).
43. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1994).
44. See iL § 552a(b) (1994 &Supp. 1111997). Exceptions are made for certain agencies, such
as the Census Bureau, Congress, and a consumer reporting agency. See id.
45. See HaNDRicKs ET AL., supranote 6, at xvii.

1326

INDIANA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 74:1321

recordkeepers."4 The Commission, made up of congressional and presidential
appointees,47 recommended the enactment of several new laws and the amendment
of existing laws, including those covering employment," banking,49 and education.5"
Congress, however, passed only one new privacy law following the Committee's
report; that law protected bank records from informal government access."
The realm of education fared differently. In 1974, Senator James Buckley
introduced the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act as a Senate floor
amendment to a bill extending the Elementary and Secondary Education
Amendments of 1965.52 The legislature adopted FERPA in 1974 after some
discussion but without public hearings or committee study and reports.53 Although
the Buckley Amendment contains no preface or statement of purpose, Senator
Buckley stated that "[t]he immediate reason for the legislation was ...the growing
evidence of the abuse of student records across the nation,"54 but it was also meant
to assure parent and student access to education records, and to protect the privacy
of those records." Another purpose recently identified is to enhance students'
educational achievement through their parents' involvement.56
There was, however, some question about whether FERPA's purpose is to
address individual records violations or only to prevent systematic violations. The
law on its face does not answer this question, but every court which has addressed
the issue has said that FERPA protects against systematic violations only."7 While
no court has ruled that FERPA allows a private cause of action, many courts have
said that the Buckley Amendment creates a privacy interest under § 1983.5"
FERPA conditions the receipt of federal education funds on the agencies keeping
student records confidential, with parental consent for access by third parties

46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See PRIVACY PROTECTION
SociaTY 231-75 (1977).
49. See id. at 107-24.

STUDY COmm'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION

50. See id. at 428-44. The Commission recommended 15 amendments to FERPA. See id.
51. See HENDRICKS ET AL., supra note 6, at xviii. Congress's failure to enact any other new
laws has been blamed on opposition from interest groups in the other areas that the Commission
studied; the banking industry welcomed the effort to clarify privacy rights in that area. See id.
52. See Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 513, 88 Stat 484, 571 (1974)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); see also S. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1026
(1974).
53. See S. CONF. REP. No. 93-1026.

54. 121 CONG. REc. 13,990 (1975) (statement of Sen. Buckley).
55. See 120 CONG. REc. 39,863 (1974); see also Belanger v. Nashua, 856 F. Supp. 40,47

(D.N.H. 1994) (noting these purposes).
56. See 140 CONG. REC. S10290 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
57. See Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Mattox, 830 F.2d 576, 579 (5th Cir. 1987); Fay v. South
Colonie Cent Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 1986); Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d
1267,1276-77 (8thCir. 1977); Achman v. Chicago Lakes Indep. Sch. Dist, No. CIV. 2426,1999
WL 194193, at *8-9 (D. Minn. Apr. 2, 1999); Tombrello v. USX Corp., 763 F. Supp. 541,541
(ND. Ala. 1991), Moore v. Hyche, 761 F. Supp. 112, 112 (ND. Ala. 1991); Smith v. Duquesne
Univ., 612 F.Supp. 72,80 (W.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1986); Price v. Young,
580 F. Supp. 1, 1 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Zaal v. State, 602 A.2d 1247, 1255 (Md. 1992).
58.42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. H 1996); infra Part I.B.
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normally required.59 These records may be accessed by the qualified student or the
student's parents and may be challenged by the qualified student or the student's
parents if they find the records to be misleading, inaccurate, or in violation of the
student's privacy rights.6 The statute also requires schools to notify parents and
qualified students of their rights under FERPA.6 '
As a part of the General Education Provisions Act,62 the Buckley Amendment
conditions the receipt of federal education funding on compliance, rather than
directly requiring deference to it.63 Congress does not provide federal funds to
schools to defray the cost of their compliance with FERPA.64
II. TBE CuRmiErR

ROLE OF FERPA 61

The computer age has elevated the need for information privacy.66 Modem life
has transformed schools from an age when they kept a few paper records in filing
cabinets into the fast-moving present in which their students' activities, including
more than the students' academic records, are recorded and stored in the schools'
computer systems. The advent ofthe computer age eases the transferring of student
records within and between schools via electronic mail or fax, potentially creating
undue intrusions into the lives of students.
Because student records may be easily accessed and transferred by schools,
stricter privacy protections for students are required. FERPA has been, for twentyfive years, the source of regulation for the access and accuracy of student records.67
FERPAregulates the student records kept by most public and private schools at all
educational levels in the United States.6 Although the level of regulation under the
Buckley Amendment is comprehensive, critics suggest that it was a congressional
afterthought, pointing to FERPA's passage as a floor amendment to other
educational legislation with no public hearings, committee reports, and little floor
debate.69 Since it passed Congress in 1974, FERPA has been substantively amended

59. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(a), (b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999).
60. See id.
61. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(e) (1994).
62.20 U.S.CA. §§ 1221-1235 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999).
63. See id § 1232g(a), (b). Any school receiving federal funds or distributing federal financial
aid is therefore required to comply with FERPA.
64. See Lynn U. Daggeft, Bucking Up Buckley I: Making the Federal Student Records

Statute Work, 46 CATH. U. L. Rnv. 617,620 (1997). Over 20 years ago, the Privacy Protection
Study Commission found that FERPA compliance was not unreasonably costly to schools. See
PRIVACY PROTEroN STUDY COMM'N, supra note 48, at 418. There is nothing to indicate that
compliance is costly today.
65. Although independent research was performed, Daggett's article, supranote 64, provided
the general organization for a large portion of this Part
66. See HENDRcKs ETAL., supra note 6, at xi.
67. See 20 U.S.CA § 1232g (West 1990 & Supp. 1999); see also Family Educational Rights
and Privacy, 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.1-.67 (1998).
68. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(aX1) (1994).
69. See Daggett, supra note 64, at 620; T. Page JohnsonManagingStudentRecords:The
Courtsand the Family EducationalRights andPrivacyAct of 1974, 79 WEST'S EDUC. L. Rnp.
1, 1-2 (1993).
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four times with one critic noting that each of the amendments, like the original
legislation, was a small provision inserted into a piece of larger legislation which
did not involve the regulation of student records.7" Indeed, because it lacks a
remedial provision, the Buckley Amendment has been called a "toothless" statute
by one of the few writers in recent years who has taken up the subject.7
In its first fifteen years, FERPA was amended only slightly in 1979 to allow the
disclosure of records without parental consent to educational authorities conducting
audits and program evaluations, and in 1986 to update its reference to the Internal
Revenue Code.73 In the 1990s, however, Congress substantively amended FERPA
three times.74 In 1990, Congress passed the Student Right-to-Know, Crime
Awareness, and Campus Security Act, which requires colleges and universities to
publish statistics on campus crime for distribution to applicants and current
students.75 One provision of this act modified FERPA to allow colleges and
universities to inform the victims of violent crimes of the outcome of school
disciplinary proceedings.76 In 1992, Congress again extended-the Higher Education
Act of 1965,"7 with a section of this legislation altering the Buckley Amendment's
language regarding law enforcement records.7"
The most significant changes to the Buckley Amendment occurred in 1994, when
Congress passed the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, which extended
the Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments for another five years.79 Two

70. See Daggett, supra note 64, at 617, 620-21.
71.Id at 659; see alsoKrebs v. Rutgers, 797 F. Supp. 1246, 1257 (D.N.J. 1992) (noting the
"complete inadequacy" of the Buckley Amendment's enforcement mechanism and the "failure"
of the statute to provide a remedy).
72. SeeActofAug. 6,1976, Pub. L. No. 96-46, § 4(c), 93 Stat. 338, 342 (1979) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(5) (1994)).
73.See Tax ReformAct of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,100 Stat 2085, 2095 (1986) (replacing
"Internal Revenue Code of 1954" with "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" in 20 U.S.C. §
1232g(b)(1)(H)).
74. The Deparlment ofHodth, Education, and Welfare first issued FERPA regulations in June,
1976,18 months after the Act passed. See PRIVACY PROTETION STUDY COMM'N, supranote 48,
at 416; Family Education Rights and Privacy, 41 Fed. Reg. 24,662 (1976) (codified at 45 C.F.R.
pt 98). The first major revisions were adopted in 1988. See Family Education Rights and Privacy,
53 Fed. Reg. 11,942 (1988) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 99). The Secretary ofEducation recently
finalized regulations to implement the 1994 statutory changes. See Family Educational Rights and
Privacy, 61 Fed. Reg. 59,292 (1996) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt 99). On June 1, 1999, the Secretary
proposed amendments to implement the Higher Education Amendments of 1998. 64 Fed. Reg.
29,532 (to be codified at34 C.F.R. pt 99) (proposed June 1, 1999). Comments must be received
by the Department before August 2, 1999. Id.
75. Pub. L. No. 101-542, § 204, 104 Stat 2381, 2385-87 (1990) (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1092 (1994)).
76. This amendment has been codified at 20 U.S.CA § 1232g(b)(6) (West 1990 & Supp.
1999).
77. Higher EducationAmendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325,106 Stat 448 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
78. See id. § 1555(a), 106 Stat at 840 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii)
(1994)).
79. Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat 3518 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
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sections of this Act amended FERPA in several ways80 and attempted to provide
greater parental access to records, while reducing the schools' burden of
compliance and making enforcement easier on the Department of Education. 1 The
1994 amendments added mandatory penalties for FERPA violations by third
persons to whom schools disclose records;' created different requirements for
schools to allow them to comply with subpoenas of school records;83 replaced the
general exception for disclosures without consent with an exception for reporting
records to juvenile justice authorities without consent;84 and made an allowance for
schools to advise staff members of disciplinary actions taken against a student
where safety risks are involved.8
In 1998, Congress once again amended FERPA, passing the Higher Education
Amendments of 1998.' Aside from extending the authorization of programs under
the Higher Education Act of 1965, the Act imposed limitations on the type of
information that can be disclosed about the perpetration of a violent crime or
"nonforcible sex offense."" The amendment states that only the name of the
perpetrator, the offense, the punishment imposed by the school, and, by written
consent, the name of a victim or witness may be provided; however, the added
language indicates that such information may be disclosed to anyone, as long as the
crime committed violates "the institution's rules or policies with respect to such
crime or offense."88 Additionally, a post-secondary institution may disclose to the
parent or guardian of a student under twenty-one years old any violations of the
school's drug or alcohol policy by the student, unless state law prohibits such
disclosure. 9

80. See id §§ 249,261(h), 108 Stat at 3924-26,3928 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1232g(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999)).
81. See 140 Cong. Rec. S10290 (daily ed. Aug. 2,1994) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
82. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(bX4)(B) (1994) (banning the school from allowing "access to
information from education records to that third party for a period of not less than five years").
Senator Grassley, who proposed the amendments, cited the lack of an effective enforcement
mechanism as the reason for this penalty. See 140 Cong. Rec. S10290 (daily ed. Aug 2, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Grassley).
83. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(bXlXJ). Senator Grassley noted that, because of increased crime
among young people, schools have been presented with court-issued subpoenas for students'
records. As a result, schools have been put in the difficult position of choosing whether to be
charged with contempt of court for failing to honor the subpoena or to be charged with violating
FERPA, an offense which could cause the school to lose its federal funding. See 140 Cong. Rec.
S10291 (daily ed. Aug. 2,1994) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
84. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(bX1)(E).
85. See id. § 1232g(h).
86. Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat 1618 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.). The Secretary ofEducation has announced proposals to amend 34 C.F.R. 99 to effectuate
these amendments. See 64 Fed. Reg. 29,532 (to be codified at 34 C.F.R pt 99) (proposed June
1, 1999).
87.Id. § 951,112 Stat at 1835 (codified as amended at20 U.S.CA. § 1232g(bX6)(B), (C)
(West Supp. 1999)).
88.Id.
89. See id. § 952, 112 Stat at 1836 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.CA § 1232g(i) (West
Supp. 1999)).
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The above amendments changed the coverage of FERPA, but did not affect the
Act's functioning. The following discussion explains the requirements and basic
procedures of the Buckley Amendment.
A. Definitions

1. Scope
FERPA applies to all educational agencies that receive federal education funds"
under most programs,91 regardless of whether the educational agency is public or
private, state or local, or an elementary school, secondary school, trade school,
college, or university.92 FERPA only covers governmental agencies that provide
educational services, but if one part of an educational agency receives funds, then
FERPA applies to the entire agency.93 This Note refers to all educational agencies
as "schools."
2. "Students"
FERPA covers records of a school's current and former "students." 94 Applicants
who have never attended a school, including those students who are admitted but
not enrolled and those students denied admission, are not "students."95 Records of
school employees are also not protected under the Buckley Amendment.9"

90. Funds may be provided directly to the educational agency or institution in the form of a
grant, or indirectly through its students, in the form of loans. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.1(c) (1998).
91. An educational agency that does not receive funds under a program, but has students who
receive non-monetary benefits under the program, is not subject to FERPA. See id. § 99.1(b).
92. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(3) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 99.1(a). A 1994 modification clearly
states that FERPA also applies to state educational agencies. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(B).
FERPA does not apply to schools receiving federal funds through a source other than the
Department of Education. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.1(a).
93. See 34 C.FR. § 99.1(d); see alsoKneeland v. NCAA, 650 F. Supp. 1076, 1089-90 (W.D.
Tex. 1986) (holding that the NCAA and athletic conferences are not subject to FERPA), revd on
other grounds, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988).

94.20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(6); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (1998) (defining a student).
95. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(6); United States v. Brown Univ., No. Civ. A. 91-3274, 1992
WL 2513, at *2 (ED.Pa. Jan. 3, 1992) (maintaining that FERPA did not protect the financial aid
records of students who were accepted to a school but choose not to attend); Norwood v.
Slammons, 788 F. Supp. 1020, 1026 (W.D. Ark. 1991) (indicating that an unenrolled student did
not have standing under FERPA); Vandiver v. Star-Telegram, Inc., 756 S.W.2d 103, 107 (Tex.
App. 1988) (finding that recruitment records of an unenrolled student were not protected by

FERPA).
96. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(aX4)(B)(iii). The employee records of students who are employed
by a school, for example, in a work-study program, are protected by FERPA. See Daggett, supra
note 64, at 623 n.45.
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3. "Parents"
FERPA broadly gives rights to "parents," including caretakers who are not
biological parents as well as adult students.97 A "parent" under FERPA means
either parent, unless there is a court order or state law revoking parental rights.9"
A "parent" may also be a guardian, stepparent, or grandparent who is "acting as a
parent in the absence of a [biological] parent." 9
When the student turns eighteen or enrolls in a post-secondary school, the
Buckley Amendment transfers privacy rights from the parent to.the "eligible
student.""' As a result, college and adult students, but not their parents, have the
right to access their own records. However, if a parent declares a college or adult
student as a dependent on the parent's income tax returns, the school may disclose
records to the parent without the student's consent.' Schools also have the option
of providing students with the same rights as their parents, as well as additional
rights. 2 Thus, schools may disclose records to students without their parents'
consent.
4. "Records"
FERPA also defines "records" broadly to include any recorded information that
is directly related to a particular student and is created or maintained"0 3 by a school,
school employee, or a person "acting for"'0 4 a school.'0 5 The record must contain
"personally identifiable information" about the student, including the student's
name, parent or other family member's name, address or family's address, personal
identifiers such as social security number, a list of personal characteristics that

97. This Note sometimes refers to "parents" as those people with FERPA rights.
98. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 34 C.F.R §§ 99.3,99.4 (1998).
99.Id. § 99.3.
100.See 20 US.C. § 1232g(dy, 34 CF.L §§ 99.3,99.5(a) (1998). When accelerated students
enter college atayoung age, their parents' FERPA rights transfer to them. See Daggett, supra note
64, at 628 n.85.
101. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(bX1)(H).
102. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.5(b).
103. When a school has destroyed or not kept a copy of a record, there is no longer a FERPA
record. See Olsson v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 571 N.E.2d 585, 589 (ind. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that a letter written by a university faculty member but not copied and kept by the school
was not a FERPA record). In Olsson, the request for records was made after the school had
decided not to keep a copy of the letter. Id. at 587. However, if a request for FERPA records is
pending, the records are notto be destroyed. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 34 C.F.R.
§ 99.10(e) (1998).
104.20 U.S.C. § 1232g(aX4XAXii).
105. See id. § 1232g(aX4); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3.
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would result in easy traceability, or other similar information.' School records that
0 7
contain information about no single identifiable student are not FERPA records.
The information kept in a record does not need to be in written form; any
permanent recording such as a tape, picture, or computer file can be a record."" In
addition, student information does not have to be in the official student file to be a
record for Buckley Amendment purposes. 09 Records also do not need to. be created
by the school, as long as the school maintains them."' Finally, schools must be
careful to edit education records that contain information about more than one
student, such as a teacher's grade book, so they do not reveal information about
other identifiable students."'
Four types of information are not considered school records under FERPA."2
Documents prepared by a school employee or ancillary personnel to that employee,
which are not accessible to or accessed by anyone else, including other school
employees"' (often referred to as "sole possession notes"), are not protected as
records under FERPA." 4 This exception may keep the treatment notes of school
counselors or the notes of teachers confidential;" 5 that is, parents' requests to see
these notes need not be honored because they are the private notes of the maker.
Once a third party (such as a school administrator or the student) accesses the
notes, however, they become records for Buckley Amendment purposes." 6 Notes
that are accessible to a third party when created are not sole possession notes, even
if a third party never sees them."'
FERPA does not protect unrecorded information, such as something overheard
by a teacher, nor student information obtained from an external source, such as a

106.34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (listing some of the categories of personally identifiable information).
107. See Obersteller v. Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist., 874 F. Supp. 146, 149 (S.D. Tex. 1994)
(holding that a letter written to an editor by a school secretary regarding an unnamed and
unidentified student does not violate FERPA); see also Red & Black Publ'g Co. v. Board of
Regents, 427 S.E.2d 257, 261 (Ga. 1993) (finding that the records of university disciplinary
charges for hazing violations against fraternities and sororities are not FERPA records).
108. See 34 C.F.R. § 993; see also MR ex rel. RR v. Lincolnwood Bd. ofEduc., 843 F. Supp.
1236,1239 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that a videotape made by a school without parental consent
was a record), a.ffd sub noma. Rheinstrom v. Lincolnwood Bd. of Educ., 56 F.3d 67 (7th Cir.
1995). See generallyCharles R. Tremper & Mark A. Small, PrivacyRegulation of Computer.

Assisted TestingandInsction,63 WAsH L.REv. 841,843 (1988) (discussing privacy concerns
involved in computerized school records).

109. See, e.g., Belanger v. Nashua, 856 F. Supp. 40, 50 (D.N.H. 1994) (concluding that
juvenile court records in a school attorney's file are protected under FERPA).
110. See id.
111. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(aX1XA) (1994); Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 34 C.F.R.
§ 99.12(a) (1998).
112. See Daggett, supra note 64, at 626.

113. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3.
114.34 C.F.R. § 99.3.
115. See Daggett, supra note 64, at 626.
116. See id.

117. See ParentsAgainstAbuse in Schs. v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 594 A.2d 796, 802-03
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (concluding that the notes of a school psychologist's interviews with
students are not "sole possession notes" and may be accessed under FERPA in this case, where
the parents permitted the interviews on the condition that they would receive a copy of the notes).
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newspaper article."' Also, for college students or students eighteen and older,
FERPA records do not include health treatment records accessible only to
healthcare staff, even if they are not sole possession notes;" 9 however, access is
available to a treatment professional of the student's choice.' In addition, school
records created regarding former students, such as records of alumni achievement,
are not FERPA records.''
Furthermore, as a result of the 1994 amendments, FERPA records do not include
those created and maintained for law enforcement purposes by a law enforcement
unit within an educational agency."' Although Congress created this exception for
campus police records at colleges and universities,'23 the language would allow the
records of a separate security unit created in an elementary or secondary school
district to be exempt from FERPA. 124 Records relating to security which are
maintained by other school employees, such as building administrators, who 5are not
part of a law enforcement unit, however, are records covered by FERPA.1
B. Consent
As a general rule, third parties may not access student records without written
and dated consent from the parent or qualified student; indeed, under most
circumstances, consent is needed for the release of student records even to
administrators. 126 The consent must specify the records to be accessed, the person
who may access them, and the reason for the disclosure.'27 When an educational
agency releases records pursuant to written consent, the parents and student may
also receive a copy of the records upon request. 128 Oral disclosure of information
contained in student records is prohibited under FERPA. 9
There are, however, several exceptions to the consent requirement. These
exceptions are described at 34 C.F.R. § 99.31. Although schools may disclose
student records without consent in these circumstances, FERPA does not require
them to do so.' 3 '

118. See Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1050 (ED.N.Y. 1979) (holding that
information contained in a student newspaper is independent of school records and, therefore, not
protected by FERPA).
119. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(aX4)(BXiv) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3.
120. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(aX4)(BXiv); 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.3,99.10(f) (1998).
121. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.3.
122. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(aX4)(BXii); 34 C.F.R. § 99.8(bX2) (1998).
123. See HR. REP. No. 102-447, at 128 (1992).
124. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(aX4)(BXii); 34 C.F.R. § 99.8(bX2). This exception may be
increasingly important in the wake of recent high school and elementary school tragedies.
125. See 34 C.FR § 99.8(bX2).
126. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(bXl), (2) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999).
127. See id. § 1232g(bX2); 34 C.F.R. § 99.30(b) (1998).
128. See 34 C.FR. § 99.30(c). A school may charge a fee for this copy. See id. § 99.11 (1998).
129. See id. § 99.3 (1998) (including the oral, written, or electronic release of information
contained in records).
130. See id. § 99.31(b).
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1. The Exceptions
FERPA allows schools to make internal disclosures of records to other officials
or employees who the school determines to have a "legitimate educational
interesto]" for inspecting student records.' However, the school must ensure that
the records are not accessible to others during the transmission of the documents
to persons with legitimate educational interests.' Non-school employees or
officials may not receive records under this exception, even though they may have
some other legitimate interest in the student.'33
School records may also be sent to another school in which the student is trying
to enroll, in which the student is enrolled concurrently, or from which the student
receives services. 34 The school sending the information must make a "reasonable
attempt" to provide advance notice to the parents unless they have already
consented, or if the school's annual notice to parents regarding student records
includes a statement that student records are forwarded for these reasons.'1
Some private information is considered "directory information"'c and may be
released to the general public without parental consent, including but not limited
to the student's name, address, phone number, date and place of birth, major or
field of study, participation in school activities and sports, height and weight if the
student is on an athletic team, dates of attendance, degrees and awards, and the last
school attended.'37 The school must designate directory information,' 38 and parents,
within a specified timeline, must have an opportunity to object to the release of
some or all directory information about their children. 39 The same notice is not
required for directory information concerning former students.'

131.Id. § 99.31(aXI).
132. See Daggett, supra note 64, at 632.

133. See Irvine (CA) Unified Sch. Dist, 23 INDIvs. DisABiLrrms EDuc. L. REP. (LRP) 1077,
1078 (FPCO Feb. 20,1996) (finding a FERPA violation where a local school released a student's
records to his doctor in order to obtain advice about handling the child's medical condition). The
1994 amendments added language to the Buckley Amendment providing that teachers and school
officials with alegiimate educational interest in the behavior of a student who has been disciplined
for dangerous conduct affecting others may be informed about disciplinary actions and other
related "appropriate information" about the student 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(h) (1994); see also icl
§ 1232g(bX6)(B) (allowing information to be disclosed regarding the final results of a disciplinary
hearing of the perpetrator of a violent or sex-related crime). The 1998 amendments will allow
limited information to be accessed by anyone, if the student's offense violates school policy. See
Pub. L. No. 105-244 § 951, 112 Stat. 1618, 1835 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C-A.
§ 1232g(bX6)(B), (C) (West Supp. 1999)); see also 64 Fed. Reg. 29,532,29,533 (1999) (to be
codified at34 C.F.R. § 99.31(aX13)) (proposed June 1,1999).
134. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(bXl)(B) (1994); 34 C.F.. § 99.34(b) (1998).
135.34 C.F.R. § 99.34(a).
136.Id. § 99.3.
137. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(aX5XA); 34 C.F.YR § 99.3.
138. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.37(a) (1998).
139. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(aX5)(B); 34 C.F. §§ 99.3, 99.37(aX2), (3).
140. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.37(b).
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2. The Access Log
Schools must maintain a written log detailing the release of nondirectory
information without consent to people other than the parents, student, or other
employees in the school system; the log must also include requests for disclosure42
that were declined,"' and it must be kept with the records as long as they exist.
Every time the records are accessed or there is a request for access, the log must
specify the name of the party to whom the records were released, that person's
legitimate interest in the records, and any permitted redisclosures.14' Only parents,
may use
custodians of recordsand their assistants, and other educational authorities
44
the log, and use is limited to auditing and evaluating purposes.
When someone other than the parent or eligible student receives student records,
that person must be notified of his or her obligation not to disclose the records to
anyone without the written consent of the parent or qualified student, except 1as
46
permitted by the statute,14 ' and must also keep his or her own written access log.
Should the receiver violate FERPA with regard to the disclosed records, the school
that released the records must not allow that receiver access to student records for
at least five years." 7
C. Notice
Under FERPA, schools annually and "effectively" 14 must notify eligible current
students or parents of current students of their rights under the Buckley
Amendment. 4 The notice must include the qualified student's or parent's right to
inspect adid review the student's records, challenge the accuracy of the student's
records, provide consent before the records are released to third parties except as
provided by FERPA, and file a complaint with the United States Department of
Education."' If a school intends to release a student directory, the annual
notification should note this disclosure, list the types of personally identifiable
information to be included, and explain the deadline and process for objecting to
the release of the information."' Schools are not required to provide notice to
2
former students."1

141. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(bX4XA); 34 C.F.R. § 99.32(aX1) (1998).
142. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(bX4XA); 34 CS.R. § 99.37(aX2).
143. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(bX4XA); 34 C.F.R. § 99.32(aX3), (b).
144. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(bX4XA); 34 C.F.R. § 99.32(c).
145. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(bX4)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 99.33 (1998).
146. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(bX4XA); 34 C.F.R. § 99.32(aX3), (b).
147. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(bX4)(B).
148.34 C.F. § 99.7(bX2) (1998).
149. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(e) (requiring effective notification); 34 C.F.R. § 99.7(b) (stating
that notice must be "reasonably likely to inform" the parents or eligible students of their rights).
150. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.7(aX2) (listing parent notice requirements).
151.See id. §§ 99.37, 99.7.
152. See id. § 99.7(aXl) (requiring notice only to current students).
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D. Enforcement
People whose rights under FERPA have been violated should file a complaint
with the Family Policy Compliance Office ("FPCO")."' Complaints must be filed
within six months (180 days) of the alleged violation, or from the time the
complainant knew or should have known of the violation, unless an extension of
time is granted by FPCO. 5 4 The FPCO will notify the complainant if the complaint
does not specify the allegations or is not timely filed. 5
When the FPCO receives a complaint, it notifies the school, 56 but it does not
need to provide the school with a copy of the complaint.'57 The FPCO will request
a written response from the school,"' and it may allow the parties to provide it with
additional information.'59 The FPCO then investigates the complaint, 6 ' makes a
finding, and notifies the complainant and the school in writing of its finding and its
reasoning;' 6' it does not hold a hearing. 62 The Buckley Amendment does not
provide a deadline for processing complaints, and resolution may take months or
years. 163
If the FPCO finds a FERPA violation, it is only authorized to ask the offending
school to voluntarily comply. 64 The FPCO will provide the school with specific
guidelines to follow in order to comply with FERPA, including a deadline within
which the school must come into compliance. " 5 If the school fails to comply, the
Secretary of Education may withhold funds the school currently receives, force

153. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(g); 34 C.FL § 99.63 (1998). The FPC Office's address is: Family
Policy Compliance Office, U.S. Department of Education, Washington D.C., 20202-4605. See id.
154. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.64 (c)-(d) (1998).

155. See id. § 99.65(b).
156. See id. § 99.65(a).
157. See id § 99.65(a)(1) (requiring notice to the schools of only the substance of the alleged
violation).
158. See id. § 99.65(a)(2).
159. See id. § 99.66(a).
160. See id. § 99.64(b).

161.See id. § 99.66(b).
162. Of course, if the FPCO determines that the school has a pattern of violating the Buckley
Amendment and decides to withdraw federal funds, a hearing is required. See 20 U.S.C. 1232g(g)
(1994).
163. See, e.g., Irvine (CA) Unified Sch. Dist, 23 IItrvs. DISABLED EDuc. L. EP. (LRP) 1077,
1077 (FPCO Feb. 20, 1996) (finding a FERPA violation almost two years after a parent's letter

claiming the school disclosed information from a student's education records to the student's
doctor without her consent); Iowa (Case Name Not Provided), 20 INIvs. DISABILITMES EDUC. L.

Rm,. (LRP) 105 (FPCO May 14,1993) (finding a FERPA violation one year after the parents filed
their complaint). One eligible student mailed a letter to the FPCO in March 1998, and received a

response from the FPCO in October 1998, to the effect that it was investigating the complaint See
Letter from Student to Family Policy Compliance Office, Dep't of Educ. (Mar. 23, 1998) (on file
with author); Letter from Family Policy Compliance Office, Dep't ofEduc., to Student (Sept 10,
1998) (on file with author). As of June 17,1999, the student has not yet received the results of the
FPC Office's investigation.
164. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(f) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 99.66(c)(2) (1998).

165. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.66(c).
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compliance through a court order, or terminate the school's eligibility for future
funding.'" If the complaint is resolved, the parties are notified to that effect. 6 7 Of
course, schools are entitled to a hearing before funds are withheld.'" To date, the
FPCO has never attempted to withdraw federal funds based on FERPA violations.' 69
17
III. ALTERNATIVE REMEDmS IN INDIANA AND ELSEWHERE 0

FERPA has been labeled ineffective and toothless in recent years because of the
lack of remedies provided by it upon its violation. Indeed, several courts have also
noted the inadequacy of the remedies that the Buckley Amendment provides to
people whose privacy rights have been violated. A New Hampshire district court
noted that "neither the statute nor the regulations gives an explicit remedy that
would be beneficial to the plaintiff."'' A New Jersey court used stronger language,
calling the regulations "complete[ly] inadequa[te]," and failing to require "complete
relief for aggrieved individuals."'7 While the federal statute is criticized for its lack
of effectiveness, courts in many states have found ways to allow redress for those
who have suffered FERPA violations. However, of all the courts to have heard
cases brought under FERPA, Indiana courts alone offer no additional remedies to
plaintiffs in actions involving the Buckley Amendment.
Title 20 of the Indiana Code governs education, and has no sections regarding
student records or student or parental rights therein.' Even Article 12, which
governs state universities and occupational schools, does not provide for student
privacy rights. 74 As a result, students in the State of Indiana are given no additional
rights and are protected only by federal law, the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act.
A. Private Cause ofAction
Although they term the remedies under the Buckley Amendment inadequate,
courts reviewing the issue are unanimous in holding that FERPA does not provide
parents or qualified students the right to file a private lawsuit against a school to

166. See id. § 99.67(a).
167. See id. § 99.67(b).
168. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(g); 34 C.F.R. § 99.60(c) (1998); see also 34 C.F.R. § 81 (1998)
(regarding the use of the General Education Provision Act Review Board for hearings involving
the withdrawal of federal education funds).
169. A search of Westlaw, FED-ADM:N database, on June 17, 1999, shows no reported
decisions, indicating that the FPCO has never attempted to withdraw funds.
170. The authorwould like to acknowledge her use of Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking Up Buckley
ff: UsingCivil~ightsClaimsto Enforce the FederalStudentRecordsStatute, 21 SEArrLE U. L.
REV.29 (1997), and Ralph D. Mawdsley, LitigationInvolvingFERPA, 110 EDuc. L. REP. 897
(1996), for portions of the organization in this Part.
171. Belanger v.Nashua Sch. Dist, 856 F. Supp. 40, 47 (D.N-. 1994) (finding a § 1983 claim
available and not requiring exhaustion of FERPA's administrative remedies).
172. Krebs v. Rutgers, 797 F. Supp. 1246,1257 (D.N.J. 1992).
173. See ND. CoDE § 20 (1998).
174. See id. § 20-12.
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challenge alleged violations.1" This includes decisions rendered in the Second,
Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, as well as by trial courts in the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits. 76 Primarily, the courts cite the absence of such a provision within FERPA
itself, as well as a similar absence of legislative intent providing for a private right
of action.177
Like the courts of other states, Indiana also does not recognize a private cause of
action under FERPA. In Olsson v. Indiana University Board of Trustees, the
Indiana Court ofAppeals explicitly followed the trend of the federal circuit courts,
declaring that "[n]o private right of action exists under [the] Family Educational
17
Rights and Privacy Act."
B. Section 1983 Claims
A more successful claim to redress violations of FERPA by public schools may
be a claim filed under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 79 Under the Civil Rights Act,
school officials acting under color of state law may be held liable for actions which
deprive students of their rights under federal law.' Because § 1983 applies only
to public officials, officials of private schools who violate the Buckley Amendment
may not be sued under it' Several courts have allowed a § 1983 action to remedy
violations of FERPA,' and legal scholars consider these claims the best available

175. See, e.g., Tarka v. Franklin, 891 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that only the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare can file an action under FERPA); Fay v. South
Colonie Cent Sob. Dist, 802 F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that FERPA does not provide
aprivate right of action); Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267, 1276-77 (8th Cir. 1977)
(explaining that aprivate cause of action does not arise under FERPA); Odom v. Columbia Univ.,
906 F. Supp. 188, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (dismissing an individual's private claim that Columbia
University violated FERPA); Francois v. University ofD.C., 788 F. Supp. 31, 32 (D.D.C. 1992)
(noting that FERPA does not provide for a private cause of action).
176. See Klein Indep. Sch.Dist. v. Mattox, 830 F2d 576 (5th Cir. 1987); Fay, 802 F.2d 21;
Girardier,563 F.2d 1267; Tombrello v. USX Corp., 763 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ala. 1991); Moore
v. Hyche, 761 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ala. 1991); Smith v. Duquesne Univ., 612 F. Supp. 72 (W.D.
Pa. 1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1986); Price v. Young, 580 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
177. See, e.g., Tarka, 891 F.2d at 104; Fay, 802 F.2d at 33; Girardier,563 F.2d at 1276-77;
Odom, 906 F. Supp. at 195.
178. 571 N.E.2d 585,589 n.4 (Ind.Ct App. 1991).
179. For acomprehensive discussion of § 1983 claims as a remedy for FERPA violations, see
Dagget, supra note 170,and Mawdsley, supra note 170.
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1 1996).
181. See id.
182. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,4 (1980) (holding that § 1983 permits claims that are
based on alleged constitutional violations, as well as on alleged violations of federal statutes);
Cullens v. Bemis, No. 92-1582, 1992 WL 337688 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 1992) (unpublished
decision) (stating that FERPA"does create an interest that may be vindicated in a § 1983 action');
Achman v. Chicago Lakes Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 97 CIV.2426, 1999 WL 194193, at *7-9 (D.
Minn. Apr. 2, 1999) (concluding that"FERPA section 1232g(b)(1) creates a federal right that is
enforceable through section 1983 actions'); Gundlach v. Reinstein, 924 F. Supp. 684,690 (E.D.
Pa. 1996) (analyzing § 1983's applicability to FERPA claims); Doe v. Alfred, 906 F. Supp. 1092,
1098 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (refusing, without discussion, to dismiss FERPA-based § 1983 claim),
appeal dismissed, 79 F.3d 1141 (4th Cir. 1996); Krebs v. Rutgers, 797 F. Supp. 1246, 1256
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remedy."' A claim may be brought for the school's failure to provide access to
8 4
parents or students, or the inappropriate release of student records."
A § 1983 claim may be brought against public school districts and boards of
education, public colleges and universities, as well as against the agents, officials,
and employees of these entities.' However, § 1983 limits the theories of liability
against government bodies, such as a board of education or a school district, to
violations that are pursuant to an official policy or custom of that body.'86 In
general,187one school employee's actions do not amount to the school's policy or
custom.

To prove a prima facie case under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant acted under color of state law with the requisite state of mind (usually
more than ordinary negligence), causing a deprivation of rights under federal law
or the Constitution. 8" Section 1983 allows an action for violations of federal
statutes enacted under Congress's spending authority, such as FERPA, only if the
statute "unambiguously confer[s] an enforceable right upon [its] beneficiaries." 8 "
A defendant to a § 1983 action may raise several affirmative defenses. For
example, state defendants may plead Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal
court cases. 90 Defendants may also raise a good faith defense of "qualified" or

(D.NJ. 1992) (examining a § 1983 Buckley-based claim); Norwood v. Slammons, 788 F. Supp.
1020,1026 (W.D.Ark- 1991) (notingthatFERPA claims may be brought under § 1983); see also
Tarka, 891 F.2d at 104-05 (affirming summary judgment for school on § 1983 claim where
plaintiff was not a student); Fay, 802 F.2d at 21 (affirming judgment under § 1983 for ajoint
custodial parentfor aFERPA violation.); Obersteller v. Flour BluffIndep. Sch. Dist., 874 F. Supp.
146, 149 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (dismissing FERPA claim on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to
satisfy the § 1983 requirements).
The only court to have wholly rejected FERPA-based § 1983 claims is an Indiana district court.
SeeNorris v. Board of Educ., 797 F. Supp. 1452,1464-65 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (finding the Buckley
Amendment's administrative enforcement mechanism, the FPCO complaint, exclusive, therefore
barring a claim under § 1983, and also rejecting a § 1983 claim based on constitutional privacy
deprivation).
183. See Daggettsupra note 170, at46 (stating that § 1983 claims have been most successful
in courts); Mawdsley, supranote 170, at 1 (same).
184. See Mawdsley, supra note 170, at 6.
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
186. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,382-92 (1989).
187.SeeWare v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 492,902 F.2d 815, 820 (10th Cir. 1990); Landstrom
v. Barrington Sch. Dist. 220,739 F. Supp. 441,449 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Daggett, supranote 170, at 47.
189. Suter v. Artist ., 503 U.S. 347, 357 (1992) (holding that a requirement of "reasonable
efforts" by states under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act does not confer and
enforceable right).
190. See U.S. CoNST. amend. X; see also Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 3 F.3d 1482,
1485 (11th Cir. 1993), vacated,19 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a state university
president acting in his official capacity has Eleventh Amendment immunity). It is likely that § 1983
defendants in state court will try to remove the case to federal court in order to raise the Eleventh
Amendment defense.
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"official" immunity,"' if the defendant's actions do not violate a clearly established
right about which a reasonable person would have known, then the defendant has
good faith immunity."" If the claim is based on a due process violation, an adequate
state remedy will defeat the § 1983 claim,1 93 but administrative exhaustion is not
194
required.
If a prima facie case is proven, and an affirmative defense is unsuccessful, a wide
variety of remedies are available to the plaintiff, including nominal and
compensatory damages' 95 If the violations are reckless and intentional, punitive
damages may be available. 9 ' In addition, victorious plaintiffs may have their
attorney's fees reimbursed by the defendant. 9 7
Unfortunately, federal courts in Indiana are the only courts that have denied
§ 1983 claims under FERPA. In Norris v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs
brought a claim under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in conjunction with
their tort claims.' The court said that "FERPA provides expressly that the
Secretary of Education is responsible for enforcing the provisions of FERPA;
Section 1983 does not create a private right of action for damages where the federal
statute provides an exclusive administrative enforcement mechanism." 99 The court
made no reference to the decisions of courts in other circuits.20°
C. Section 1985(3) Claims
A more recent trend in litigation involving FERPA violations stems from
§ 1985(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.211 Section 1985(3) provides a cause of
action in cases in which two or more people have conspired to deprive a person or
class of people of a protected right, through actions based on "racial, or perhaps
other class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. 202 A plaintiff may prove a
prima facie case under § 1985(3) by showing that there was a conspiracy for
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. A
plaintiff must also prove that defendants engaged in an act in furtherance of the

191. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (recognizing the defenses of "absolute"
and "qualified"immunity); see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,321 (1974) (stating that school
board officials have good faith immunity).
192. See Harlow,457 U.S. at 818-19.
193. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981), overruled on other groundsby Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
194. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 507 (1982).
195. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,254-55 (1978).
196. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,35-36 (1983).
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
198. 797 F. Supp. 1452 (1992).
199. Id. at 1464.
200. See id.
201.42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994). For a discussion of § 1985(3) claims, see Mawdsley, supra
note 170, at 5.
202. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263,268 (1993) (quoting Griffin
v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)).
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conspiracy which injured the plaintiff or the plaintiff's property or deprived the
plaintiff of any right or privilege of citizens of the United States." 3
Although courts have consistently held that a school board "is a collection of
individuals... [and] a school board and its employees constitute a single legal
entity which is incapable of conspiring with itself for the purposes of Section
1985(3),"' ' 4 one legal commentator has proposed that "if school districts or
universities, or their employees, conspire with other outside entities to violate
FERPA, a section 1985(3) cause of action is stated.""0 5 Brown v. City of Oneonta,
a case in which New York State Police tracked the assailant of an elderly woman
to the Campus of State University of New York's Oneonta campus ("SUCO"),
supports this contention.26 The state police, acting on the description of the
assailant as a black male, requested the city police to obtain a list of all black males
on campus from SUCO's Public Safety Office. 0 7 SUCO granted the list, and the
state police questioned the people whose names appeared on the list.2 " The men
who were questioned as a result of the disclosure of the list, alleged, among other
claims, that SUCO had violated FERPA under § 1985(3); they contended that
school officials, city police, and state police had conspired to deprive them of their
rights as citizens ofthe United States.2 " The federal district court refused to dismiss
the conspiracy charges, observing that the "plaintiffs sufficiently elaborate the
factual grounds on which they base their conspiracy claims in regard to the creation,
approval, and release of the list."210
However, on appeal, the Second Circuit found that "no clearly established right
of plaintiffs was infringed and appellants are entitled to qualified immunity from
claims of conspiracy." 211 The court questioned the scope of the "emergency
exception" under 34 C.F.R. § 99.36.212 By 1992, there had been no adjudications
regarding the emergency exception, so the creation and release of the list was not
clearly unlawful. Indeed, the educational institution had discretion to determine
what constituted an emergency. Based on these factors, the court determined that
and that
the plaintiffs had no clearly defined and recognized right under FERPA
213
defendants acted reasonably and in good faith with regard to the list.
The Second Circuit ruling does not eliminate the potential use of § 1985(3) as a
claim for relief. Its language implies that a valid § 1985(3) claim may still be raised
provided that plaintiffs articulate with clarity a specific right, recognized by the
Supreme Court, that has been violated. 214 Additionally, a state official must

203. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
204. Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649,653 (5th Cir. 1994).
205. Mawdsley, supra note 170, at 5.
206. 911 F. Supp. 580,583 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
207. See id.
208. See id. at 584.
209. See id. at 584-85, 593.
210. Id. at 593.
211. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 106 F.3d 1125, 1128 (2d Cir. 1997).
212. Id. at 1132.
213. See id.
214.See id. at 1131.
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understand that his or her acts violate that right.2 5 So far, however, no other
attempts to claim relief for a FERPA violation under § 1985(3) seem to have been
made.216 Although Indiana courts have not ruled on any § 1985(3) claims under
FERPA, it is unlikely that they would allow such a claim after Norris, in which they
stated that there is absolutely no allowance for a private cause of action under
217
FERPA.
D. State Tort Claims
While federal claims under FERPA may be successful, state law tort claims
provide no redress. Negligence claims, for example, may be proven with respect to
their first prong, the breach of the duty of reasonable care; however, nominal
damages are unavailable for negligence claims and proof of a particular harm is
most unlikely. 218 Similarly, claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress
("IIED") are unlikely to succeed. 219 IIED requires not only intentionally or
recklessly outrageous behavior on the part of the defendant, but also that the
plaintiff suffer "severe emotional distress," evidenced by physical symptoms or
through medical or psychological treatment.220 Violations of the Buckley
Amendment are not likely to be considered "outrageous" or to result in severe
emotional distress.2"'
Moreover, defamation claims based on improper disclosure of student records
generally do not succeed because defamation law requires the plaintiff to prove that
the statements released are false. 22 School records normally include true, although
private, information. Claims of invasion of privacy may also fail, however, because
the disclosure of student records would probably not be found to be "highly
offensive to a reasonable person," and they may even be found to be "of legitimate
223
concern to the public."
While no Indiana cases exist regarding suits under FERPA specifically claiming
negligence, IIED, defamation, or invasion of privacy, one may surmise from the
cases which are available that Indiana will not allow such claims. Indeed, in Norris,
an Indiana district court held that a school corporation may not be held liable under
the Indiana Tort Claims Act224 regardless of whether its employees were acting
within the scope of their employment'2 Ifthey were acting within the scope of their

215. See id.
216. A search in Westlaw, ALLFEDS database, on June 17, 1999 revealed no new results.
217. See Norris v. Board of Educ., 797 F. Supp. 1452, 1464-65 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
218. See Daggett, supra note 170, at 42.
219. See id.
220. REsTATEiENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
221. See Daggett, supra note 170, at 43.
222. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,778 (1986) (holding that the
plaintiff has the burden of proving the falsity of the statements).
223. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977); see also Culver v. Port Allegany
ReporterArgus, 598 A.2d 54, 55 (Penn. Super. Ct. 1991) (affirming the dismissal of an invasion
of privacy claim against a newspaper because the public had an interest in a special education
student's evaluation costs).
224. IND. CODEANN. §§ 34-13-3-1 to -25 (1998).
225. See Norris v. Board of Educ., 797 F. Supp. 1452, 1459 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
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employment, then the Tort Claims Act provides immunity for the school corporation
(which would otherwise be held to the doctrine of respondeat superior), and if they
were not, then the bridge of liability required for respondeat superior would be
absent and the school corporation could not be held liable for the employee's
acts.

2 26

227
Also, in Doe v. Methodist Hospital,
a plurality of the Indiana Supreme Court
declined to recognize that the public disclosure of private facts, part of the tort of
invasion of privacy, may form the basis of a civil action. 228 Doe involved a man who
disclosed to emergency medical workers that he had tested positive for the human
immunodeficiency virus ("HIV"). This information was noted on his chart, which
was subsequently read by Doe's co-worker's wife, an employee at Methodist
Hospital where Doe was seeking treatment. 2 ' The co-worker's wife disclosed the
information to her husband, who further disclosed Doe's HIV status to other coworkers."' This chain of events is not unlike the unauthorized disclosure of student
-records, such as what may have happened to Jane in the hypothetical described in
the Introduction to this Note; if an unauthorized individual, such as the friend or
roommate of the student on the Committee on Residency, views Jane's records
without her consent and then discloses the knowledge contained therein to others,
that person has violated the Buckley Amendment and invaded Jahe's privacy.
Similar to the plaintiff in Methodist Hospital,Jane will have no remedy in an action
for invasion of privacy in the Indiana courts.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Indiana courts are not following the trend toward relief for victims of Buckley
Amendment violations created by courts in other jurisdictions. In order to prevent
a further diminishing of respect for FERPA in Indiana, the courts should re-evaluate
the policy implications of the Norris ruling. If the courts provide wronged
individuals a legal remedy for records violations under FERPA, the ineffectiveness
of Congress's remedies would be counteracted.232 Therefore, Indiana's courts
should again analyze the reasoning of courts in other jurisdictions which have
allowed recovery under § 1983.
In Norris, the court made no reference to the opinions of courts in other
jurisdictions when it ruled that FERPA's exclusive enforcement mechanism
prohibited a cause of action under § 1983.233 Other courts have not found the
administrative remedy so limiting. The Pennsylvania district court in Gundlachv.

226. See id. at 1459 n.3 (discussing the liability of the school corporation). Without specific
statutozy immunity, the common law doctrine of respondeat superior holds the employer liable for
the acts of its employee within the scope of the employee's employment See id.
227. 690 N.E.2d 681 (Ind. 1997).
228. Id.at 693.
229. See id.at 683.
230. See id.
231. See id.

232. For one court's view, see Krebsv. Rutgers,797 F. Supp. 1246, 1257 (D.N.J. 1992).
233. See Norris v. Board of Educ., 797 F. Supp. 1452, 1464-65 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
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Reinstein found that to validly state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that he or she was deprived of a right guaranteed by the Constitution or a federal
statute.233 The focus of such a claim should not be whether a constitutional or
statutory right was violated, but whether the constitutional or statutory right at issue
vests the plaintiff with an enforceable right.? 6 When a plaintiff invokes § 1983 to
enforce a statute enacted pursuant to Congress's spending power, "the relevant
inquiry is whether the Congress unambiguously conferred upon the beneficiaries of
the statute a right to enforce its requirements. "' 23' The Gundlach court also found
that Congress's intention in enacting FERPA was to impose upon participating
institutions a mandatory obligation to avoid a practice of permitting the
unauthorized release of education records.23 Such a mandatory obligation would
seem to provide an unambiguous right on the part of the beneficiaries to enforce the
statute. Therefore, if an educational institution engaged in a practice of releasing
students' education records without parental authorization, then the parents or
qualified students would have a cause of action against the institution under § 1983.
Similarly, in Norwood v. Slammons,2 9 an Arkansas district court said that
although "[c]ourts have held that... FERPA creates no private cause of action, a
plaintiffmay assert a FERPA violation as the basis of a claim under § 1983"24 The
court also noted that FERPA regulates the release of student records, so parental
consent must be obtained before information from a student's records may be
disclosed. 24 ' Thus, in order to assert a § 1983 claim based on a FERPA violation,
a student or parent need only allege that an educational institution has violated that
student's or parent's FERPA rights.242
Perhaps if the district courts in Indiana were not willing to follow the reasoning
of courts in other jurisdictions, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which has not
yet heard a FERPA-based § 1983 claim, would follow the trend in its sister circuits.
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in Gundlach, implicitly
agreeing with the district court's analysis of the application of § 1983 to FERPA
violations. 243 The Second Circuit also would allow a § 1983 action based on a

234.924 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 114 F.3d 1172 (3d Cir. 1997).
235. See id at 691 (citing Frazier v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 868 F. Supp. 757,763
(E.D. Pa. 1994)).
236. See id. (citing Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 357 (1992) (citing in turn Wilder v.
Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498,509 (1990))).
237. Id. (citing Suter, 503 U.S. at 357).

238. Id. at 692 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (1994)).
239.788 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
240. Id. at 1026 (citations omitted).
241. See id. (citing Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Mattox, 830 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1987); Lawson
v. Edwardsburg Public Sch., No. 1:90-CV-68,1990 WL 359811 (W.D. Mch. Nov. 14,1990)).
242. See id.
243. See Gundlach v. Reinstein, 114 F.3d 1172 (3d Cir. 1997), afg 924 F. Supp. 684 (ED.
Pa. 1996).
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44
violation of the Buckley Amendment,
as would the Fourth Circuit, 245 Fifth
2 and the Sixth Circuit.2 47
Circuit, "
The courts, however, are not alone responsible for the strengthening of FERPA
in Indiana: The Indiana legislature should reconsider the issue of privacy rights and
student records. If the courts are unable or unwilling to provide relief, the
legislature should attempt to do so. Illinois has made an effort through the
enactment of the Illinois School Student Records Act,24 which, unlike FERPA,
provides specific remedies to parents and students whose rights have been violated
under it2 49 The Illinois School Student Records Act allows an action to be instituted
in an Illinois circuit court,250 and, if there is a willful or negligent violation of
FERPA, then the Act allows an action for damages, including actual damages, the
costs of the action, and reasonable attorney's fees.2 ' Additionally, the state's
attorney may bring an action for injunctive relief on behalf of the State Board of
Education.252 The Illinois School Student Records Act extends its reach to allow
criminal proceedings against an offending individual. 3
Also, in order to prevent litigation in the first place, Indiana schools need to be
more capable of administering records under the Buckley Amendment. That is, the
Indiana legislature should provide definitive guidelines directing to whom the
school may and may not provide records and which records a person other than a
parent or student may be entitled to review. These guidelines should also be made
available to parents so that they may more fully understand their rights under
FERPA. Without such measures, Indiana is inviting abuse of student records by its
schools.

CONCLUSION

Most courts outside of Indiana have allowed an action for a violation of FERPA
to be brought under § 1983 because of the lack of an effective enforcement
mechanism within the Buckley Amendment. Until Congress acts to strengthen
FERPA, it will be up to the states to ensure that students are not left without privacy
rights. The current status of FERPA leaves parents and students like Jane without
recourse in Indiana. Thus, Indiana courts should review their stance on student
privacy rights and allow actions based on violations of the Buckley Amendment to
be brought under § 1983, and the Indiana legislature should work as well to ensure
that students and their parents maintain privacy rights in student education records.

244. See Fay v. South Colonic Cent. Sch. Dist, 802 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1986).
245. See Doe v. Alfred, 79 F.3d 1141 (4th Cir. 1996), ajg906 F. Supp. 1092 (S.D. W. Va.
1995).
246. See Tarka v. Franklin, 891 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1989).
247. See Cullens v. Bemis, No. 92-1582, 1992 WL 337688 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 1992)
(unpublished decision).
248. 105 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 10/1-10 (West 1998).
249. See id. 10/9(a-(c).
250. Id. 10/9(a).
251. See id. 10/9(b)-(c).
252. See id. 10/9(d).
253. See id. 10/9(e).

